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are larger in the former situation than in the latter. Capital market integration harms (benefits) the 
leading (lagging) region if domestic spillovers are more important than international spillovers 







JEL codes: F12, F21, F43, O41 
 





*Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The 
Netherlands; Ph. +31.13.466.2920, Fax: +31.13.466.3042, j.a.smulders@uvt.nl 
 
The author's research is supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He 
thanks Lucas Bretschger, Theo van de Klundert, and Richard Nahuis, Thomas Steger, and 
Helmut Wagner for comments on an earlier version.  1. Introduction 
 
One of the central questions in debates about international economic relations and policies is 
what allows countries with relatively low income to grow at a relatively high rate of growth so 
that they can catch up with the richer countries. Europe had been successfully catching up with 
the US during the decades following the second world-war, but since the late 1990s European 
policy makers have been concerned about the fact that the convergence process came to a halt 
and that European income levels failed to fully converge to those in the US. Within Europe, 
similar questions arise. The single market program was intended to spur growth and convergence 
within Europe. Yet, structural differences weaknesses of lagging regions have been considered as 
obstacles in the convergence process. The extension of the European Union to Eastern Europe 
has been expected to speed up convergence of income and productivity levels between “Old” and 
“New” Europe, but debates continue about how far convergence will go and who will gain most 
from the integration process. On world level, liberalization of capital markets since the 1980s has 
increased world capital flows, supposedly financing investment in capital-scarce regions and thus 
stimulating convergence. However, it has also raised concerns about globalization and its effects 
on welfare.   
In this paper, I present a two-region endogenous growth model to study the following 
type of questions. Under what conditions do income levels in rich and poor countries converge, 
and how fast? How is regional growth affected by capital market integration? What are the 
welfare effects from faster convergence and international integration?  I study how rates of 
convergence are affected by the presence of international capital markets, by international goods 
market conditions, and by structural differences between regions. In particular, I contrast two 
regions that start with different productivity levels and that differ in their structural innovation 
capability. The latter can be the result of differences in human capital levels and schooling 
policies, innovation policies or infrastructure, or, as it has been coined (cf. Furman et al 2002), 
differences in the quality of national innovation systems.  
The model in this paper is a two-region model of endogenous growth based on in-house 
R&D. There is a given number of firms. By spending on R&D, each of them invests in firm-
specific knowledge, which determines their productivity level. The cost of R&D depends on the 
firm-specific knowledge stock, as well as on national and international knowledge average 
knowledge stocks. The latter two determinants capture intertemporal knowledge spillovers and 
result in the familiar research externality, which makes firms invest too little in R&D.  
The main results are as follows. Long-run productivity gaps are determined by the 
difference in R&D capability. Over time, there is conditional convergence in productivity levels. 
The speed of convergence is larger with integrated international capital markets than without. 
Long-run gaps in consumption levels are larger in the former situation than in the latter. Capital 
market integration harms (benefits) the leading (lagging) region if domestic spillovers are more 
 
  1 important than international spillovers and if differences in R&D capabilities are small.  
The topic of convergence has received a lot of attention in the theoretical growth 
literature. Two strands stand out in this literature. The first strand focusses on growth driven by 
(human) capital accumulation with one final good produced only and perfect competition. A 
distinction should be made between closed and open economies. Closed economy models predict 
convergence between rich and poor countries as long as there are diminishing returns with 
respect to reproducible capital. Poor countries have low levels of capital and realize high rate of 
return to investment so that they grow relatively fast (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). If there are 
constant returns to capital, growth differentials are persistent and there is no convergence (the 
AK-model, see Rebelo 1991). In the open economy setting, capital is assumed to be mobile. In 
the simplest version, convergence in productivity levels is immediate since capital flows to the 
poor country that has accumulated less capital and realizes a high (ex-ante) rate of return. 
However, this is at odds with empirical research that finds a limited rate of convergence, of about 
two per cent only (Temple, 1999). The introduction of adjustment costs or borrowing constraints 
makes the rate of convergence limited again (see Turnovsky and Sen, 1995; Barro, Mankiw and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995). While financial capital is internationally mobile, physical (and human) 
capital have to be accumulated in the country where they are used. Investment in the domestic 
capital stock takes time and is costly in terms of foregone consumption, even though borrowing 
from abroad is possible. In the present paper, productive capital stocks (firm specific knowledge) 
is home-grown, too, which explains why convergence takes time.  
The second strand of literature focuses on growth driven by R&D with monopolistic 
competition and differentiated goods in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It is found that 
spillovers of knowledge between countries are important for convergence. If there are no such 
spillovers and if no inputs in production are traded, countries that start at different productivity 
levels diverge (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 chapter 8; Feenstra, 1996). With international 
spillovers, most analyses find that international growth rates converge in the long run (Wälde, 
1996; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). In this literature both goods trade and international capital 
mobility are considered. However, so far it has not been explored how, in the presence of 
monopolistic competition and R&D-based growth, convergence is affected by international 
capital mobility and by structural differences between the regions. The welfare effects of 
differences in convergence rates is also ignored, not only in the monopolistic competition 
literature (see, however, Diehl and Gundlach 1999). The present paper aims at filling these gaps. 
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
discusses structural (long-run) results. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the dynamics of productivity and 
consumption, respectively. Section 6 analyses welfare and Section 7 concludes. The appendix 
contains derivations of equations and proofs of claims in the main text.  
 
 
  2 2. A slightly asymmetric two-country endogenous growth model  
 
2.1. Structure of the model 
There are two countries (or regions consisting of several countries) that are characterized by 
identical preferences and primary factor endowments, and similar – but not identical –
technological opportunities. One country, indexed by superscript A, starts at a more Advanced 
productivity level than country B (also referred to as the Backward country). We also allow one 
country to have a higher productivity in research activity than the other, to reflect structural 
differences. The central question is whether the two countries, when starting from this initial 
asymmetry, converge in terms of productivity levels, how fast they converge, and how welfare in 
the two countries evolves over time. We answer this question for two equilibria (or regimes). 
First, in the balanced trade (BT) regime, capital markets are not integrated and the goods trade is 
balanced. Second, in the capital mobility (CM) regime, international capital markets are perfectly 
integrated, interest rates are equalized, and changes in net foreign asset holdings allow countries 
to smooth consumption. Comparing these two regimes of capital market integration allows us to 
assess the role of capital market integration in the convergence process.  
Each country has one primary factor of production in fixed supply (labour), which is 
allocated over two activities, production and research. Produced goods are differentiated and 
each variety is produced by a single monopolistic firm. These firms control and accumulate firm-
specific knowledge (as in Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995). Within each country, there is a 
continuum of symmetric firms on the unit interval. This allows us to save on notation by 
formulating the model for a single representative firm. All goods are traded in international 
markets at zero transport costs. 
Table A presents the structural relationships. Countries are denoted by superscript i = A, 
B (and if necessary also by superscript j for the other country). Each line in the table represents 
two equations, one for each country. To simplify notation, I have not only omitted the time 
argument (t), but also the regime index (k = BT, CM, for balanced trade and capital mobility, 






Labour productivity in production is denoted by h as appears from eqs. (A.1), relating 
output of final goods X to labour input L. Firms have an opportunity to increase labour 
productivity h by performing R&D according to eqs. (A.2). Productivity can be increased by 
allocating labour (R) to R&D. Productivity in R&D depends on a country specific fixed 
coefficient ξ
i and three sources of knowledge (h
 i, ¯,h
 i and ¯,h
 j ). First, firms build upon specific 
knowledge accumulated in the past. Second, all firms benefit from knowledge spillovers 
emanating from other firms in their country. Third, there are knowledge spillovers from abroad. 
Knowledge spillovers relate to the average level of knowledge in the different economies 
(denoted by ¯,h), rather than the total knowledge stock. This captures the fact that not all 
 
  3 knowledge developed in an economy is relevant for a particular firm because of technological 
differences (Peretto and Smulders, 2002, provide a micro-foundation and explain why this avoids 
the so called scale problem; see also Bretschger and Steger, 2004). Parameters αh and αf measure 
the productivity of spillovers, from domestic and foreign firms respectively, in the firm’s 
innovation process. 
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Market clearing  X
 i = D
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i = 1 (A.7)   
Endogenous  variables:     Parameters: 
X  output       αf  foreign spillover parameter 
h  labour  productivity     αh  domestic spillover parameter 
L  labour in production        ξ  research productivity parameter 
R  labour in research        ϑ  utility discount rate 
D  consumption domestically produced    σ  elast. intertemporal substitution 
goods       ε   elast. of substitution between 
home 
M  imports      and  imported  goods 




ll equations apply to i, j = A, B and j…i. Time argument (t) and regime index (k) omitted. 
 
Productivity levels differ across countries, but are identical across firms within a country. 
For this reason average knowledge levels are equal to the knowledge levels of firms in each 
 
  4 country (¯,h
 i = h
 i ). The scale parameter ξ reflects the capability of firms in country i to use 
knowledge and labour effort to produce innovations; it reflects the country’s skill level (human 
capital), innovation policies, infrastructure and institutions conducive to innovation.  
Intertemporal preferences in the consumption index C are given in eqs. (A.3). Infinitely-
lived households apply a constant utility discount rate ϑ. The elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution equals the constant σ. The consumption index (C) combines consumption of 
domestically produced varieties (D) and imported varieties (M) by way of a CES sub-utility 
function, with an elasticity of substitution denoted by ε , eqs. (A.4). Unless stated otherwise, we 
assume  1 ε > , which seems most realistic. There is a continuum (with mass 1) of domestically 
produced and imported goods, they are imperfect substitutes and the elasticity of substitution 
among them equals η > 1, eqs (A.5).   
Goods markets clear, see eqs. (A.6). The supply of labour is normalized at one and equals 
total demand for labour, see eqs. (A.7).  
 
2.2. Consumer and firm behaviour 
The behavioural equations of the model are summarized in Table B. Consumers maximize 
intertemporal utility over an infinite horizon. The decision problem consists of three stages 
subject to the usual budget constraints. In the first stage, each consumer decides on the path of 
aggregate consumption over time. This gives rise to the familiar Ramsey rule, shown in eqs. 
(B.1). The growth rate of consumption equals the difference between the real consumption rate 
of interest and the pure rate of time preference, multiplied by the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. In the second stage consumers split total per period consumption spending over 
domestically produced varieties and foreign varieties, eqs. (B.2). The price elasticity of demand 
is equal to ε  in all cases considered. Eqs. (B.4) define the price index of aggregate consumption. 
Since there are neither transport costs nor international differences in preferences, this index is 
the same in both countries. By choosing the composite consumption good as the numeraire, we 
can set the aggregate consumption price equal to one. In the third stage, consumers decide how 
to split expenditures on home and foreign goods over the different varieties, eqs. (B.3). 
Producers maximize the value of firm over an infinite horizon (for details, see the 
appendix). Each firm faces a downward sloping demand function for its products as appears from 
eqs. (B.2) and (B.3). Profit maximization implies that firms set a mark-up over (marginal) cost 
equal to η/(η!1), as in eqs. (B.6). Labour demand for R&D follows from setting marginal 
revenue (ξKph) equal to marginal cost (w), eqs. (B.7). The shadow price of firm-specific 
knowledge ph is introduced as a costate variable in the dynamic maximization procedure. Firms 
face a trade-off with respect to investing in specific knowledge as appears from the arbitrage 
conditions (B.8), which state that investing an amount of money equal to ph in the capital market 
(the RHS of B.7) yields the same revenue as investing that same amount of money in knowledge 
creation. The latter raises labour productivity in the production sector and hence revenue in this 
 
  5 sector (first term on the LHS of B.7), it raises also the knowledge base in R&D (second term) 
and it yields a capital gain (last term). We assume all firms within a country are symmetric, 
, so that 
ii
z hh =∀ i
ii
z p p =∀ i
)
. This is why we have omitted the firm index z in (B5)-(B.8). 
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Goods market equilibrium ()
AA BB A B
c X pX p CC p += + (B.9) 
 
Balance of payments   0  BT  regime  (B.10a) 
ii i
c Xp Cp −=
   
ii i ii i
c X pC pr F F −+=    CM  regime  (B.10b)   
 
Symbols 
F  net foreign assets      pc  price index consumption 
r  nominal interest rate      p output  price 
w  wage  rate     ph  firm's shadow price of knowledge 
A
 
ll equations apply to i, j = A, B and j…i. Time argument (t) and regime index (k) omitted. 
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Finally, eqs. (B.10) imply that domestic net savings are invested in net foreign assets (F). Domestic savings are the sum of the trade balance and interest receipts on foreign assets. Under 
perfect capital mobility the rate of interest is uniform across countries (r
A = r
B). At the other 
extreme there is the case of balanced trade or zero mobility implying F = 0. Both regimes with 
respect to the balance of payments will be analysed. 
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Goods market equilibrium 
A AA BBB A B p hL phL C C += +  (C.7) 
 
Balance of payments       BT  regime  (C.8a) 
ii i Cp h =
i L
)
i       CM  regime  (C.8b)  ( ) (
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Notation: hats denote growth rates,  ˆ
c gC ≡  consumption growth;  ˆ gh ≡   productivity growth. In 
ll equations j = A, B; i = A, B and j … i. Time argument (t) and regime index (k) omitted.  a  
 
2.3. Semi-reduced model 
Table C reduces the model to eight key equations. In deriving the equations, we take into account 
that all firms within a country have the same productivity level, h
i=¯,h
i. The growth rates of h 
and C are denotes by g and gC respectively. 
Equation (C.1), which is derived from (B.1) and (B.4), restates the Ramsey rule. It 
represents the relationship between consumption growth and the required rate of return on 
households= savings. Equation (C.2) combines (B.7) and (B.8). The equation represents the rate 
of return that firms can maximally pay to households. Equation (C.3) represents labour market 
equilibrium. It states that the amount of labour not allocated to production, results into 
 
  7 productivity growth. The productivity in research depends on the knowledge gap h
i/h
j. A low 
stock of knowledge relative to the other country induces large spillovers and allows the country 
to grow faster at a given amount of labour allocated to research. The international terms of trade 
is given by (C.4), which combines (A.1), (A.6) and (B.2)-(B.3). Equation (C.5), which follows 
from (C.4) and (B.4), translates the terms of trade into the national price level. Equation (C.7) 
equates the value of world consumption to the value of world production and follows from (A.1), 
(B.4), (B.9). Equation (C.6), which is derived from (A.1) and (C.4), gives the value share of 
country i’s production in world production. Since preferences are homothetic and prices are the 
same in both countries, s
i is also the share of country i’s goods in each country’s consumption 
basket. Balance of payments equilibrium is represented by equations (C.8), which follow from 
(A.1) and (the integral of) (B.10). With balanced trade, the value of consumption equals the 
value of production. With capital mobility, the intertemporal butget constraint implies that the 
net present value of future consumption, denoted by  , equals the net present value of 





We now reduce the model to a set of equations in the key variables , and 
. From the other equations in Table C we find the following system of differential equations 
(see appendix):  
/ ,
RA B hh h L ≡
B L
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where hats denote growth rates. After substituting (C.3) and (C.6) to eliminate g
i and s
i, we find a 
system of three differential equations in the key variables  , and  . To simplify 
notation, I have not only omitted the time argument (t), and also the regime index (k = BT, CM), 
which apply to each variable (roman letters). The regime of capital market integration affects the 
structure of the differential equations only through 
/ ,
RA B hh h L ≡
A B L
k Γ , which takes the following values (I will 
use capital Greek letter to denote composites of parameters that are regime-specific): 
 











  8  
In the equations above, equation (1) governs the dynamics of the productivity gap. Equation (2) 
governs the allocation of production over the two countries; it is basically the no-arbitrage 
equation that ensures that in both countries the capital market is in equilibrium. In contrast, 
equation (3) ensures that the world goods market is in equilibrium; it governs the allocation of 
aggregate world production over time.  
 
  
3. The steady state: structural productivity gaps and growth 
 
A balanced growth path, defined as a situation in which variables grow at a constant rate, can 
only arise if  , and   are constant. From (1)-(3), we see that such a steady state 
is independent of  , so that the steady state is the same for both regimes of capital market 
integration. In the steady state, the following holds: 
/ ,


















   
 (5) 
 
1/2 /( / )
f AB AB hh
α ξξ =  (6) 
 
where country superscripts have been omitted for variables that are the same in both countries in 
the steady state. To prevent corner solutions (with zero growth), we assume 
1/2 ()
AB ζ ξξ ϑ ≡> . 
In the steady state consumption and productivity in both countries grows at the same rate 
g, see (5). As in most endogenous growth models, the growth rate falls with the discount rate and 
spillover parameters, but increases with the productivity of R&D and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. In particular, higher research capability (ξ) in one of the countries 
results in faster long-run growth in both countries. 
The long-run productivity gap is determined by differences in research capability ξ and 
the spillover parameter αf, see (6). The larger the difference in research capability between the 
two countries, the larger the structural productivity gap between them. The country with the 
highest research capability has highest productivity on the balanced growth path. The larger 
international spillovers are, the smaller the impact of cross-country differences in research 
productivity are. The country with lower research productivity tends to grow at a slower pace for 
given allocation of labour to research, but receives relatively more spillovers from the other 
country, which boosts growth. In the balanced growth path, the relatively low level of research 
capability is exactly offset by relatively high spillovers from the other country, such that both 
countries grow equally fast.  
 
  9   Long-run differences in productivity result into an asymmetric distribution of GDP. The 
share of country A’s GDP in world GDP can be calculated from (C.6) and (6) as: 
 
(1 ) / 2 1 [1 ( / ) ]
f AA B s
εα ε ξξ
−− − =+ , (7) 
 
whereas B’s share is the complement:  1
B s
A s = − . If the countries do not accumulate foreign 
assets (in BT), s
i is also the share of i’s consumption in world consumption, and relative 
consumption is given by:  
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Equations (7) and (8) reveal that income and consumption differences for given differences in 
research productivity increase with ε  and decrease with αf. The high productivity country 
produces more output, which results in more income the better the goods produced substitute for 
the goods produced in the other country (that is, the higher ε ). A high degree of foreign 
spillovers (αf) implies that a higher research productivity not only benefits own national income 
but also foreign income, which tends to reduce international income differences.  
For future use, we note that 
A B LL =  in the steady state and that the following steady state 
relationships hold: 
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where  . We asume r > g to ensure bounded utility. 
1/2 ()
AB ζξ ξ ≡
 
 
4. Productivity dynamics 
 
We now turn to the question how productivity gaps change over time and how fast they converge 
to the structural levels discussed in the previous section. Although the model can be used to 
analyse several situations, we are interested in the particular situation in which the backward 
country adopts policies that suddenly improve research capability, such that the difference in 
research capability with the advanced country (
A B ξ ξ − ) narrows, but not completely vanishes. 
According to (6), this lowers the long-run productivity gap,  /
A B hh , but it takes time before 
cumulative investment has bridged the gap between initial and structural productivity levels.   
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4.1 Convergence versus divergence 
To focus on convergence between the two countries, I solve the model in relative variables. 
Superscript R denotes ratios:  /
RA B x xx ≡
( ) ( )
RA
kk
 for any variable x, or, using unabreviated notation 
with time and regime indices,  / ( )
B
k x tx ≡





. When comparing the two regimes of capital 
market integration, we refer to ratios of variables over the two regimes. The subscript D denotes 
regime differences:  ( ) x tx ≡ t x t .  
To derive analytical solutions, we log-linearize our model around the steady state. 





D CM BT x xx =−      . Thus tilded variables measure the deviation from structural levels. Finally, a 
tilded variable with superscript W denotes the weighted sum a variable of the two countries, 
where the share in world GDP, s
i, is the weight: 
WA A B B x sx sx ≡+     
⋅ 
)
. Generally speaking, 
linearization provides a good approximation only for small deviations from the steady state (i.e. 
for  h  small). Numerical experiments with the non-linear model gave qualitatively similar 
results even for large deviations, so that the method seems justified.  
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and where   and  . The key insight is that relative 
variables   and  , the productivity gap and the ratio of employment in production, can be 
solved from (11), independently from (12). In particular, solving (11) using each of the two 
possible values of  , see (4), we find two sets of solutions for the time paths of   and 
, one the balanced trade regime (k = BT) and one the integrated capital markets regime (k = 
CM). The determinant of the matrix in (11) equals 
,
RA B RA hhh LL L ≡− ≡−       
R h   R L  
Γ
WA A B Ls L s L ≡+   
2 2 f L
()
R
k ht  
()
R
k Lt  
/ ( 1 α εζ − Γ + . Under our assumption 
 
  11 1 ε > , the determinant is negative for both regimes of capital market integration so that the 
system of differential equations is saddle-point stable. The corresponding phase diagram is 
drawn in Figure 1. As appears from eqs. (11) the h 0
R =      locus slopes downward. The figure 
depicts an upward sloping   locus, which applies under realistic parameter assumptions 
(e.g. σ < 1 and α
0
R L =    
h > αf). The stable arm of the saddle path is indicated by the broken line. Its 
slope is unambiguously positive. When the productivity gap differs from its structural level, 
transitional dynamics arise: for any  0
R h ≠   , the system moves along the stable arm and 
converges to structural levels in the long run (hL ()
RR
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To interpret the results, suppose that, in the long run, country B structurally lags behind 




, so that  , see (6). Furthermore suppose that, at time zero, 
country B lags more behind A than justified by its structural differences – that is, 
 so that  . From time zero, the productivity gap 
between A and B will gradually narrow. During this process of convergence to structural levels, 
the leading economy employs more labour in production than the lagging country ( , see 
the movement along the saddlepath to the South-West in the phase diagram). The lagging 
country allocates relatively more labour to R&D, so that it grows faster than the leading country. 
The catch-up process slows down over time and in the long run only structural productivity 
differences remain, as given by (6), while each country=s productivity expands at the same rate, 
given by (5). It may seem unrealistic that the poor country undertakes more R&D than the rich 
country. Note, however, that R&D in the model should be given a broader interpretation than 
merely patent development. It encompasses all activities that firms undertake to improve 




R L >  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
  A different picture arises for the situation in which country B lags behind A, but less than 
justified by its structural differences, where country A is still the country with highest research 
productivity; that is,   so that  ( / 0) 0 < . In this situation the 
productivity levels in the two countries will diverge rather than converge over time (in the phase 
diagram, we start to the left of the point of intersection and move along the saddlepath to the 
right). The productivity gap becomes larger over time in favour of country A.  
  In the sequel of this paper we will focus on the convergence case. Unless stated 
otherwise, we make the following “catching-up situation” assumption:  
 
A B ξ ξ >  and   and  (0)
R h   ϑ      ( 1 3 )  
 
 
  12 The assumption implies that the poor country B will catch up over time with A, but it will not 
fully converge because it has lower research productivity. We refer to the case as the “catching-
up situation” – to distinguish it from the divergence situation with h (0) 0
R <   . Catching-up arises 
if the productivity gap is larger than justified by its structural differences (that is,  ), for 
example when policies have been implemented to improve national research capability, but when 
the effects have not yet fully materialized. The restriction on 
(0) 0
R h >  
ϑ  holds for reasonable parameters 
and allows us to rule out some ambiguities below.   
 
4.2 Convergence at what speed? 
Comparing the regime without international capital mobility with the regime of completely 
integrated capital markets, we find that international productivity differences converge more 
slowly in the former than in the latter (provided  1 ε > ).  
The speed at which the steady state is (locally) approached can be determined by standard 
procedures. In particular, it equals the positive scalar Λ  that solves the quaracteristic equation 
0 MI Λ += , where M is the matrix in (11) and I is the identity matrix. I denote the speed of 
convergence by a capital Greek letter to indicate that this parameter depends on the capital 
markets regime. The analytical solutions for the linearized model in (11) read: 
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( ) (0)exp( )
RR
kk ht h t Λ =−     (15) 
 
where   is deviation of the initial productivity gap from the structural productivity gap. 
Thus   is the adjustment speed that governs the dynamics of the labor allocation and relative 
productivity. A closed-form solution of 
(0)
R h  
Λ
Λ is given in the appendix. For reasonable parameters, 
 can easily take a value close to 2%, which is usually considered as the empirically relevant 
number (Temple 1999). For example, for the parameters reported in Figure 3,   lie in 
the ranges 1.51-1.57 and 3.12-3.53 percent, respectively. 
Λ
and BT CM ΛΛ
  The speed of convergence is faster with capital market integration than without 
( , see appendix for a formal proof). Consumers prefer to smooth consumption. Capital 
mobility allows a country to reduce the productivity gap at higher speed without restraining 
consumption a lot, by running current account deficits. The country of which the productivity 
gap is larger than the structural gap realizes (ex ante) a higher rate of return and can attract 
investment funds from the other country. By contrast, if capital is not mobile internationally, 
investments have to be financed fully by domestic savings, which is costly for domestic 
BT CM ΛΛ <
 
  13 consumers who want to smooth consumption. In this case, the supply of savings is less elastic, 
which slows down the process of catching up relative to the case in which foreign supply of 
capital finances catching up.  
To gain more insight into why capital market integration speeds up convergence, let us 
consider an extreme case. If ( 1)/ ε σ −  = 0, we have  0 Γ =  irrespective of the capital market 
regime. Then, the dynamics are exactly the same in two regimes, see (1)-(3); the adjustment 
speeds are the same,  BT CM Λ Λ = . This extreme case requires  1 ε = , that is Cobb-Douglas 
preferences over domestic and imported goods, or σ →∞, that is utility is linear in 
consumption. In the latter case, consumption smoothing no longer plays a role; supply of savings 
is perfectly elastic, independent of whether capital mobility applies or not, so that international 
capital mobility cannot speed up convergence. In the Cobb-Douglas case, each country earns a 
fixed share of world income, independent of how large the productivity gap is, since terms of 
trade effects exactly offset productivity effects, see (C.6). Then, there is no possibility to borrow 
or lend internationally to smooth consumption over time (cf. Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001). In the 
realistic case with  1 ε > , a country’s share in world production increases with the narrowing of 




5. Consumption dynamics 
 
5.1. Catching-up in consumption 
We now investigate how much consumption, rather than productivity, in the lagging country 
deviates over time from that in the leading country. For the balanced trade regime, this is a 
relatively straightforward question, since the value of national consumption must equal the value 
of national production. Relative consumption thus equals Cp
RR R h L
R = ++         . From (C.4), 













+−  −  =−  
 
    −                          (16) 
 
In the capital mobility regime, interest rates are the same in both countries so that consumption 
grows at the same rate and relative consumption,  , is time-invariant (see C.1). Its level 














+−   −−  =    −+   
   
Λ
                (17) 
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Figure 2 depicts the evolution of consumption and productivity under the catching-up 
assumption (13). Without capital mobility, the advanced country (A) consumes more than the 
lagging one (B), but consumption levels gradually converge to structural levels. With capital 
mobility, again A consumes more than B, but now the gap in consumption levels does not narrow 
over time, despite the fact that productivity levels converge. The reason is that country A 
accumulates foreign assets. Country B uses growing export revenues to service its foreign debt. 
Capital mobility allows both countries to smooth consumption over time. 
 
Insert Figure 2  
 
5.2. Aggregate consumption 
What are the effects of international capital market integration on the level and growth rate of 
aggregate production and consumption in the two-country world? To investigate this question, 
we need to solve for aggregate, rather than relative, variables. The value of aggregate world 
employment in production can be directly solved from (12) after plugging in (14) and (15) and 
taking into account that  :  ( ) 0
W
k L ∞=  
 









Λα α σ ζ
 +
=− −   ++ + 
    Λ  (18) 
 
The value of world production equals 
A AA BBB p hL phL +
( )
, or, as logarithmic deviation 
from the steady state,  ( )
A AAA W sp h L L ++ + +  
0
B BBB sp h L h ++ =        
AA BB sp sp
W      (to establish the right 
hand side expression, I have used the fact that  + =    , because of the numeraire 
choice, and I have used the superscript W to denote weighted sums, 
WA A B B x sx sx ≡+      ). At time 
zero, productivity levels are the same for both regimes and world production can be different 
under the different regimes of capital market integration only in so far world employment differs. 
That is, we have  (0)
W
D h 0 =   , so that   holds, where the latter expression represents 
how much world production, and hence also world consumption, is higher with capital market 
integration than without (recall that subscript D denotes regime differences). From (18) and (13), 
we derive in the appendix that 
(0)
W







=       Ch  holds. Hence, when the low 
productivity country is catching up, initial world consumption levels are higher with integrated 
capital markets than with balanced trade. 
(0)/ (0) 0
WR
D >    
The deviation of the growth rate of world production from its steady state value, as given 
in (5), can be derived from (C.3) and expressed as: 
 
 
  15         ( 1 9 )   (2 1)( )
WW A R W
kk f k kk gg L s g h LL L αζ Λ += − − − −        
W
k    
 
where we used the fact that  , because of the numeraire choice, and  0
AA BB sp sp +=      
WW LL Λ =−      , 
from (18). Comparing the different regimes at time zero, we find that initial aggregate growth is 
lower under capital mobility than under balanced trade if the low productivity country is catching 
up (since   and  (0) (0)
WW
CM BT hh =    (0) (
WW
CM BT LL 0) (0) 0
W





Intertemporal welfare of the representative consumer in a country depends on the entire path of 
consumption. The leading country has higher welfare than the lagging country. The interesting 
question is which country would benefit most from capital market integration, if at all. Let us 
start with exploring some numerical examples, which are depicted in figure 3 and calculated 
from the equations that follow below. The numbers in the figure approximate the percentage 
increase in balanced-growth equivalent consumption when switching from balanced trade to 
perfect capital mobility and when the actual productivity gap between A and B is twice the 
structural one (or 100U  in our formal notation). Consequently, if the difference 
between the actual and structural productivity gap is 200% (or, more generally 100x%) of the 
structural gap, the numbers have to be multiplied by 2 (or x, respectively).  
(0)/ (0)
iR
D h    
  Both countries experience higher welfare with integrated capital markets than without, 
provided that the countries are sufficiently different in structural terms and provided domestic 
spillovers are sufficiently small. Capital market integration allows countries with catch-up 
potential to specialize in investment without hurting consumption. Hence, there are potential 
gains from specialization. With structurally very similar countries, the gains from specialization 
are small. In a second-best world, these gains may be so small, that they are offset by distortions. 
With large knowledge spillovers, private agents’ investment decisions are distorted and result in 
underinvestment. Introducing international capital mobility shifts investment funds from the 
leading to the lagging country. Hence, the underinvestment distortion is aggrevated in the 
leading country. Indeed, for high spillovers (and small structural differences), the leading 
country is worse off in an integrated international capital market than in a world without 
international lending.  
 
insert Figure 3 
 
  We now explore the question analytically. A change in welfare can be decomposed in a 
level effect – the change in initial consumption – and a growth effect – the change in the growth 
 
  16 rate of consumption over time. Linearizing the intertemporal welfare function (A.3), we find the 




















where I have taken into account that the long-run rate of growth of consumption by construction 
equals the structural rate, so that  ( ) 0
i
Ck g ∞ =   . The larger the adjustment speed, the smaller is the 
growth effect, since the economy converges faster to structural growth rates. The change in 
welfare in (20) is scaled in such a way that the expression can be interpreted as the Balanced- 
growth-equivalent change in consumption, that is the permanent increase in level of consumption 
on a balanced growth path that generates an equivalent change in welfare.  
Taking country differences and substituting   , we 
may write for the change in country A=s welfare relative to country B=s welfare: 
() () [ ( ) () ]
RR RR
Ck k k k k gg t C t C C t Λ == ∞ −         
 














    ∞    (21) 
 
Substituting the solutions for C
R, from (16) and (17), and steady state relations, (9) and (10), we 
find for the two regimes: 
 
1( )/ ( ) 1
(0) (0)









 +− − + −  =    ++ −  
    R
k h    (22) 
 
Not surprisingly, a larger productivity gap results into a larger welfare differential, but large 
spillovers reduce the welfare gap.  
  Summing (20) over the two regions, we can derive the weighted change in world welfare: 
 
1
(0) (0) (0) (1 2 )( ) (0) ( ) (0)
WWW A R W
kk k f k k k
k





 =++ − − +   −+ 
         (23) 
 
where at the right hand side the first two terms together represent the initial change in the level of 
world consumption and the term in brackets is the initial change in the world growth rate of 
consumption from (19).  
We can now use (21) and (22) to find expressions for regime differences (recall 
D CM BT UU U =−      ): 
 















   




1( )/ ( ) ( ) ( )
fh R R CM BT
D k





εα α Λ Λ
 −  − −  =     ++ − − + − +   
     (25) 
 
To derive welfare gains of capital mobility over balanced trade for an individual country, notice 








D DD UU s U =− −      .   (27) 
 
These two expressions can be labelled the welfare premium of capital integration in the 
respective countries. We explore two special cases, one to show that a country may lose from 
capital market integration because of knowledge spillovers, and another to show that both 
countries gain from integrated capital markets if  f h α α = .  
First consider the case in which spillovers within the country are equally strong as 
spillovers between countries ( f h α α = ).  Then U 0
R
D =    and 
A BW
D D UUU ==    
D . In the catching-up 
situation the sign of the latter is positive, see appendix. Hence, both countries gain.  
Now consider the case in which both countries are structurally symmetric, that is 
A B ξ ξ =  







D D U = ⋅ 
D UU =−    . Hence, one country gains, and the other loses from capital market 
integration. Which one loses depends on whether international spillovers are larger or smaller 
than domestic spillovers. If domestic spillovers are larger than international ones ( f h α α > ), 
country A loses; if  f h α α < , B loses.  
  Turning to the general case with  , we claim the following: (i) the 
welfare gain of capital market integration increases in both countries with international 
differences in research capabilities, 
,0
A
fh s αα ≠≠ . 5
A B ξ ξ − ; (ii) if firms receive knowledge spillovers more 
from firms in their own country than from firms in the other country, that is if  hf α α > , the 
country that catches up gains from capital mobility but the other country may lose; (iii) if 
hf α α < , the leading country gains for sure, but the country that catches up may lose. These 
claims can be proved as follows. First note that when  /
A B ξ ξ  increases such that ζ remains the 
 
  18 same, 
W
D U , which is positive, increases through an increase in    A s , while 
R
D U  is unaffected (see 
27c and 30 and the results in section 3). From (26)-(27) we see that this increases welfare 
 
D U  in 
both countries. The second and third parts follows from the fact that 
 
f h α α −  determines the sign 
of 
R
D U , see (25), which affects the welfare premium of capital mobility of countries A and B in 
opposite direction, see (26)-(27).   
 
It might come as a surprise that the introduction of capital mobility does not necessarily 
improve welfare for both countries. In the standard neoclassical model with perfect competition, 
capital mobility improves welfare since no externalities are present and the market outcome is 
first best. Only in a second-best world the introduction of a missing market can deteriorate 
welfare (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). The international trade literature has studied static second-
best situations where a tariff distorts goods supply; for example Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 
(1977) show that capital mobility might hurt a small open economy that levies an import tariff on 
capital intensive goods. In our dynamic model, the investment decision is distorted because of 
knowledge spillovers. The market for public knowledge is missing, so that after introducing the 
market for international assets (that is, after capital market integration), markets are still not 
complete and we remain in a second-best world.  
Domestic knowledge spillovers imply underinvestment from a welfare point of view. 
With capital mobility, productivity in the leading country grows more slowly than with balanced 
trade and in the lagging country it grows faster, since capital flows to the lagging country. 
Therefore, capital mobility mitigates the underinvestment effect in the lagging country, but 
aggravates it in leading country. Cross-country spillovers have an opposite effect. The returns to 
innovation undertaken by one country accrue partly to its trading partner, thereby deteriorating 
its competitive position. Hence, foreign spillovers result in overinvestment from the point of 
national welfare. Capital mobility aggravates overinvestment in the leading country. Our results 
show that if the national externality is more severe than the international externality, there is on 
balance underinvestment in each country. Since capital mobility speeds up investment in the 





In the two-region growth model in this paper, initial productivity differences between regions are 
ultimately eliminated only if the two regions have equal innovation capabilities; the region with a 
structurally weak national innovation system will ultimately grow at the same rate as the leading 
region, but at a lower level. In the short run, regional productivity levels converge or diverge 
depending on whether the actual productivity gap is larger or smaller than the structural one. 
International capital market integration increases the rate at which the difference between these 
 
  19 two gaps is closed. It reduces short-run differences in consumption levels, but magnifies long-run 
differences, such that consumption is smoother over time than without capital market integration. 
Welfare does not necessarily increase with capital market integration. In particular, the low-
income region that catches up with the high-income region is likely to gain, but the latter may 
lose if firms learn more from firms in their own country than from firms in the other country.  
  It remains to be seen how the results change when national governments subsidize R&D 
to correct the externalities, and how the results change in the case of coordinated R&D policies. 
We have focussed on the second-best situation without any government intervention. Apart from 
the decision to liberalize capital markets, other policies could have important effects on 
convergence and welfare. An important implication of the model is that convergence of income 
levels between regions is stimulated by structural policies that improve the national innovation 
system in low-income regions. However, we did not make explicit (the costs of) these policies. 
More specific innovation policies could be easily modeled. The first-best situation with maximal 
welfare in the aggregate (world) economy requires innovation policy. In particular, in the steady 
state the combination of a subsidy on the labour cost of innovation and a subsidy on the return to 
savings can fully correct intertemporal knowledge spillover (both subsidies should equal 
() / ( 1 ) f hf h α αα +− − α  and hence increase with the spillover parameters). In the resulting  first-
best situation, the introduction of capital mobility increases welfare. However, such a situation is 
not very realistic. For example, in the absence of international coordination, national policies 
may be set to maximize national rather than aggregate welfare. In the two-region setting of the 
model, each country has incentives to exploit technology policy to strategically induce spillovers 
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Appendix 
 
The firm’s maximization problem (B.6)-(B.8) 
The following Hamiltonian corresponds to the maximization problem of firm z in country i: 
 
 
1 (; ) (/ ) ( ) [ ( ) () ]
hf f h zz z z z zz i z z i ji
h Hp X X X h R w p h hh R
αα α α ξ
−− =⋅ − + + ⋅ i
z
z
,   (X.1) 
 
where  p
z(A) is the firm's demand function, see (B.2),  /
zz X hL =  is labour employed in 
production, see (A.1), and the last term multiplies the co-state variable ph
z with firm-specific 
knowledge accumulation dh
z/dt, see (A.2). The firm's instruments are X
z and R
z and it controls 
state variable h
z. The first order conditions with respect to  X
z, R
z, and h
z give (B.6)-(B.8).   
 
Equations (1)-(3) 
Equation (1) follows directly from the definitions   and  /
RA hh h ≡
B ˆ ii gh ≡ . 
Equation (2) is derived as follows. Using (C.2) to find an expression for 
A B rr −
ˆ
, using (C.3) to 
eliminate terms with ξ, and using the time derivative of (C.4) to eliminate  ˆ
A B p p − , we find: 
 
1 ˆˆ (1 )( ) ( )
11
AA BB







−= − + −+ − − −+−
−−
B A B  (X.2) 
 
For integrated capital markets (k = CM), we have 
A B rr − = 0 and we directly find (2). Without 
capital market integration (k = BT), we have, from (C.1),  ˆ /
AB R rrC σ −= , and, from (C.4) and 
(C.8a), we have 
(1 ) / ()
RR R R R R Ch L p h L
ε ε − ==  (recall that superscript R denotes ratios, 
/
RA B x xx ≡ ). Hence, we may write  ˆ AB rr ˆˆ ) ( 1 )
B L (
RA hL / ε εσ − − −= + . Substituting this into 
the above equation, we find (2) for k = BT.  
Equation (3) follows from goods market equilibrium  (C.7), which reads after differentiation with 
respect to time and substitution of (C.1) to eliminate the growth rate of consumption: 
 
ˆ [ ( 1) ] ( ) ( 1) ( ˆ )
A AA B A A A A B
cc sr s r s g L s g L σσ ϑ +− − = + +− +




c sC CC ≡+  is the share of country A in world consumption. With balanced trade, 
we have 
A A
c ss = . After substituting (C.2) to eliminate the interest rates, we find (3). With 
integrated capital markets, we have 
A B rr = , so that, from (C.2), we find: 
 
 





gL gL A B p gg
LL




This equation also solves for  ˆ
A p  since  ˆ (1 ) ˆ
A AR p sp =−  from (C.5)-(C.6). Substituting the results 
into (C.2), we solve for the interest rate in the integrated capital market: 
 
[/ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
A Bi i i i i i
hf f
i
r r sgL L sg g αα α == −+ −+ − ∑
i  (X.5) 
 
Substituting this into (X.3), we find (3). 
 
Steady state 
By setting  , we find  ˆ ˆˆ 0
RAB hLL ===
A B gg =  from (1) and 
A B LL =  from (2). Substituting this 
into (C.3), we find 
1/2 / ) /(
f AB hh
ABα ξξ = , which is equation (6) in the text, and we find 
/(1 gL L) L g ζ ζ −= = − , where  . Substituting the latter result and   








) g ζ σα α − − ϑ
− +− =− −, which solves for g as in (5). From (C.2) 
we can now solve for r; substituting this solution into (C.1) gives  c gg = . 
 
Speed of convergence 
The adjustment speed  k Λ  can be solved from the characteristic equation associated to (11) and 
can be written as  
 
22 41 4 /
0
22 /
kk k k k
k
k








,         ( X . 6 )  
 
where  TL 2 ( ) /(1 ) kf h f g L ζ αα α ζ ε Γ =− +− +  and  (2 ) /(1 ) kf DL k α ζζ ε Γ = −+  be the trace 
and determinant, respectively, of the system in (11). Total differentiation of this solution gives 
, in which the denominator is positive by construction.   [] / ( 2 ) kk k k k k dd D d T T ΛΛ Λ =− + +
 
Proposition:    CM BT ΛΛ >















  =− + −      ++   
     ( X . 7 )  
 
 
  23 (i) If  f h α α ≥ , we have dd .   / 0 kk ΛΓ <
(ii) If  f h α α < , we have  /0 2 / () kk k fh f dd ΛΓ Λ α ζ α α Λ < ⇔< − ≡ . The latter inequality 
always holds for  f h α α < 0 0 : for ε Γ →∧ = k D →
0
, we have   and  ; 
for 
0 0 kC M ΛΛ =→
ε Γ =
2/ ( ) f hf ζ αα − k
→∞ ∧
M =→
, l’Hopital’s formula applied to (X.6) gives 
; since  kC ΛΛ α Λ  is continuous in ε , we therefore have 
fh α α <⇔ 02 / ( ) CM f h f Λα ζ α α < <− .  
Hence,  . Since   / 0 kk dd ΛΓ < 1 BT CM ε ΓΓ >⇔ > , see (4), we have  BT CM Λ Λ < . 
 
Aggregate production 
Proposition:  .  (0) 0
W
D L >  
Proof: From (18), we see that dL  under assumption (13). Since  , we 
have  . 
(0)/ 0
W
kk dΛ >  
) 0 T >
BT CM ΛΛ <
(0) (0) (0
WW W
DC MB LL L ≡−     
 
Aggregate welfare 
Claim:  U .  (0) 0
W
D >  
Proof for σ < 1: Substituting (18) into (24), we find  
(0) ( ) (2 1) ( ) (0)
WA
Df h f B T C M Ug s αα α σ Ψ Ψ =+ − −     R h ,  
where  () / () ( kk k rg ) k Ψ ϑΛ ζ Λ Λ ≡+ + − +  and 




D U >  
. Under assumption 
(13), we have dd . Differentiation gives    / 0 kk B TC M ΨΛ ΨΨ <⇔ > ⇔ / kk signd d ΨΛ
2 )( / )(1 ) ( ) ] k g σ σ ϑΛ − − + [( sign ζϑ =− , which is negative for  1 σ ≥  under assumption (13). 
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